




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21 May 1965



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
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3. USSR: Moscow seems to be adopting stiffer public line toward US. (Page 5)

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6. Argentina: Military leaders angered over delay in sending troops to the Dominican Republic. (Page 8)
7. Notes: Burundi; Colombia; Bolivia. (Page 9)

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* USSR: Soviet leaders seem to be adopting a harder line toward the US coincident with the arrival of Soviet military equipment in the DRV and the resumption of US air strikes against North Vietnam.

A 20 May TASS statement on President Johnson's V-E Day address of 7 May was one of Moscow's strongest attacks on the President to date. It seems intended to impress US policymakers with the USSR's intention to proceed with its program of military assistance to Hanoi. Soviet officials have recently made unusual efforts to convince US representatives of the extent of the Soviet Union's commitment to support North Vietnam in whatever course Hanoi decides upon.

The TASS statement is considerably stronger and more authoritative than Moscow's initial criticism of the President's State of the Union message last January. It reiterates the claim that US statements on improving relations with the USSR are incompatible with US "aggression" against other socialist countries.

Although TASS professed the Soviet Government's "readiness for serious negotiations to ease tensions," the statement concluded with the warning that the Soviet Union "is ready for any turn of developments." The tone of the statement indicates that the Soviet leaders are apparently prepared to accept further deterioration in US-Soviet relations.

The Soviet attack on the President's speech--which came after almost two weeks of relative silence on Moscow's part--was preceded in the 19 May Pravda by an authoritative "Observer" article which bitterly criticized US actions in the Dominican Republic. This article was in marked contrast to Moscow's earlier low-key and relatively meager commentary on Dominican events.

[* Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the analytic interpretation presented here has been produced by the Central Intelligence Agency without the participation of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.]

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Argentina: Senior Argentine military leaders are apparently angered by the government's delay in sending troops to the Dominican Republic. The armed forces commanders reportedly have rejected a government proposal to dispatch a "fact-finding" mission to Santo Domingo, and apparently are still urging the government to send Argentine troops to support the Inter-American Armed Force.

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...equates a government proposal to dispatch a civilian-military "fact-finding" mission to Santo Domingo. They also charged that the public opposition to Argentine military involvement in the Dominican Republic is at least partly induced by the government itself.]


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EAST AFRICA



NOTES

Burundi: A victory in last week's parliamentary elections by the generally pro-Western Hutus may provoke violence by members of the country's radical Tutsi minority. Having gained an ethnic majority in parliament for the first time, the Hutus may now break up the UPRONA Party through which they previously shared rule with the Tutsis, a development which some Tutsis are likely to resist.

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Colombia: Communist subversion of university student demonstrations may lead to violence in several cities and perhaps precipitate another government crisis. President Valencia's administration has not fully recovered from the political crisis it went through earlier this month, and the military in particular will be keeping a close watch on the government's ability to maintain control.

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*Bolivia: An uneasy quiet prevails, during which time it appears that the government is making a determined effort to pick up all known agitators. Communists may seek reprisal actions for the arrest of some of their leaders and the deputy chief of the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), who has collaborated closely with them. Leaders of the striking Bolivian Workers Confederation are not likely to get what they would regard as a satisfactory answer to demands they presented to General Ovando, who said he would pass them on to junta president Barrientos.

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THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

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